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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
disregarded this holding.12 It was not until the instant case that the
Missouri courts extended the doctrine of the earlier case. In this case the
fact that the call testified to was received shortly after the letter was
mailed by the witness seems practically irrefutable circumstantial evidence
of the identity of the caller, since he stated that he wished to talk about
the letter and did not deny the conversation when opportunity offered. Thus,
the principal case seems to be an advance along the same lines as the other
liberal decisions on the matter, rather than a departure from the general
rule requiring identification. H. G.
EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INcRIMINATIoN-ADMIssIBuiTY OF
RESULTS OF INTOXICATION TESTS-[Texas].-Defendant was prosecuted for
"murder without malice" for striking a pedestrian while driving an auto-
mobile. The prosecution attempted to introduce as evidence the results of
certain tests performed on defendant while under arrest to prove that de-
fendant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. These tests required
defendant to answer questions, walk, make sudden turns, touch his nose,
and submit a urine specimen for analysis. Defendant objected that the
results were inadmissible as violative of the provision of the Texas con-
stitution against self-incrimination.1 Held, that the evidence was inadmis-
sible. Apodaca v. State.2
The common law privilege against compulsory self-incrimination included
two aspects: (a) testimonial utterances (b) obtained under compulsion.
Originally the privilege was designed to prevent law enforcement agencies
from relying on forced testimony, which would quite possibly be false.3 All
but two American jurisdictions have adopted this privilege in their con-
stitutions.4 But the American courts began at an early time to emphasize the
compulsion factor of the rule to the exclusion of the requirement that the
evidence be testimonial. Under this extension of the rule, the courts in
effect prohibited examinations of the body of the accused and enforced
conduct.5
12. Meyer Milling Co. v. Strohfeld (1929) 224 Mo. App. 508, 20 S. W.(2d) 963, cert. quashed in State ex rel. Strohfeld v. Cox (1930) 325 Mo.
901, 30 S. W. (2d) 462.
1. Tex. Const. art. 1, sec. 10. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused
* ** shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
2. (Tex. Cr. 1940) 146 S. W. (2d) 381.
3. 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 276, 362, sees. 2250, 2263. See Ex
parte Frenkel (1920) 17 Ala. 563, 85 So. 878, a homicide case, where it
was held that questioning the accused concerning the number of intoxicating
drinks consumed violated the rule.
4. Iowa and New Jersey have adopted the privilege by statute. The
wording of the privilege varies among the jurisdictions. The usual phrasing
is either that in criminal cases no person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself or that no person shall be compelled to give evidence against
himself. "This variety of phrasing * * * neither enlarges nor narrows the
scope of the privilege as already accepted, understood, and judicially de-
veloped in the common law." 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 321, sec.
2252.
5. Cooper v. State (1889) 86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110; Blackwell v. State
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In order to prevent the privilege against self-incrimination from becom-
ing a tool for the guilty instead of a protection for the innocent, it was soon
necessary to make certain limitations on the growing extension. Evidence
of enforced conduct was admitted for the purpose of identifying the ac-
cused. Requiring the accused to stand in court8 or to don particular wearing
apparel7 has been held not to be within the privilege. Fingerprinting,
photographing, and measuring an arrested person is constitutionally per-
missible s Generally an examination for identifying scars, marks, or wounds
has also been acceptable. 9 There has been some conflict on the question
whether an accused person could be required to make a footprint for iden-
tification purposes, but the modern tendency is to permit this type of en-
forced conduct.o Another limitation on the extension of the rule against
self-incrimination was established by permitting compulsory psychiatric
examinations in criminal cases in which defendant pleaded insanity."1 Even
though such an examination involves questioning the accused, the courts
have placed their decision on grounds of fairness and practicality without
directly meeting the question of self-incrimination. 2
(1881) 67 Ga. 76, 30 Am. St. Rep. 72; Jordan v. State (1856) 32 Miss. 382;
People v. McCoy (N. Y. 1873) 45 How. Pr. 216; Stokes v. State (1875) 64
Tenn. 619; State v. Slammon (1901) 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097, 87 Am. St.
Rep. 711; State v. Nordstrom (1893) 7 Wash. 506, 35 Pac. 382.
6. People v. Oliveria (1899) 127 Cal. 376, 59 Pac. 772; State v. Reasby
(1896) 100 Iowa 231, 69 N. W. 451; State v. Ruck (1906) 194 Mo. 416,
92 S4 W. 706; People v. Gardner (1894) 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003;
Benson v. State (Tex. Cr. 1902) 69 S. W. 165. Cf. Turman v. State (1906)
50 Tex. Cr. 7, 95 S. W. 533 (Benson case completely ignored).
7. Holt v. United States (1910) 218 U. S. 245; Canty v. State (Ala.
1939) 191 So. 260; Ross v. State (1932) 204 Ind. 281, 182 N. E. 865;
Rutherford v. State (Tex. Cr. 1938) 121 S. W. (2d) 342.
8. United States v. Kelly (C. C. A. 2, 1932) 55 F. (2d) 67; State v.
Clausmeier (1900) 154 Ind. 599, 57 N. E. 541, 50 L. R. A. 73; Downs v.
Swann (1909) 111 Md. 53, 73 Atl. 653; People v. Les (1934) 267 Mich. 648,
255 N. W. 407; Bartletta v. McFeeley (1930) 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152 Atl.
17; People v. Sallow (County Ct. 1917) 100 Misc. 447; Conners v. State
(Tex. Cr. 1938) 115 S. W. (2d) 681.
9. O'Brien v. State (1890) 125 Ind. 38, 25 N. E. 137, 9 L. R. A. 323;
State v. Tettaton (1900) 159 Mo. 354, 60 S. W. 743; State v, Ah Chuey(1879) 14 Nev. 79; State v. Oschoa (1926) 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582;
State v. Garrett (1874) 71 N. C. 85, 17 Am. Rep. 11; Hooks v. State (1924)
97 Tex, Cr. 480, 261 S. W. 1053.
10. Admitting such evidence: Magee v. State (1908) 98 Miss. 865, 46 So.
529; State v. Barela (1917) 23 N. M. 395, 168 Pac. 545; State v. Graham
(1876) 74 N. C. 646, 21 Am. Rep. 493; Johnson v. State (1922) 91 Tex.
Cr. 291, 238 S. W. 933. Excluding this evidence: Cooper v. State (1889)
86 Ala. 610, 6 So. 110; Penton v. State (Ark. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 131;
Day v. State (1879) 63 Ga. 667; State v. Griffin (1924) 129 S. C. 200, 124
S. E. 81.
11. Ingles v. People (1933) 92 Colo. 518, 22 P. (2d) 1109; People v.
Krauser (1925) 315 Ill. 485, 146 N. E. 593; State v. Genna (1927) 163 La.
702, 112 So. 655; People v. Truck (1902) 170 N. Y. 203, 63 N. E. 281;
State v. Cerar (1922) 60 Utah 208, 207 Pac. 597; State v. Eastwood (1901)
73 Vt. 205, 50 Atl. 1077. Contra: Noelke v. State (Ind. 1938) 150 N. E.
(2d) 950.
12. Inbau, Self-Incrimination-What Can an Accused Be Compelled to
Do? (1937) 28 Jour. Cr. L. 261, 282.
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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The modern limitations on the extension of the rule seem to be returning
the majority of American jurisdictions to a use of the privilege in its
original meaning-the excluding of testimonial utterances made under com-
pulsion. But a more precise interpretation of "testimonial" is being ob-
tained. Whereas any speaking or writing was originally considered ipso
facto testimonial, the courts now seem to distinguish between questioning
for the purposes of identification or observation and questioning for the
purpose of obtaining information.13 In the instant case there was compul-
sory questioning, but the court did not consider its nature. It merely ruled
that compulsory "demonstrations" violated the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Thus, the court seems to have followed the older American
view of the rule against self-incrimination by basing its decision on the
factor of compulsion alone.14 D. A.
FEDERAL COURTS-APPEAL IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP CASES--RETRo-
SPECTEVE APPLICATION OF CHANGE IN STATE LAW UNDER Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins-[United States].-An employee sued his employer in the federal
district court in Ohio, alleging negligence resulting in occupational disease.
Under the then existing state law, plaintiff had no cause of action and the
trial court dismissed the petition. Pending hearing on appeal from the
order of dismissal, the state supreme court overruled its previous decisions
so as to allow actions of the sort plaintiff sought to bring. The circuit
court of appeals held that the state law obtaining at the time of the trial
was the law of the case. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States held: The state law as changed by the highest state court must be
given effect on appeal, so that the order of dismissal, though correct when
made, must be reversed and plaintiff's action reinstated. Vandenbark v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co.'
When there is a change in the law between trial and appeal, there are
two possible courses. Either the law and facts existing at the time of trial
must be considered as a unit, so that a change in the law will not change
the law of the case, or the intervening change in the law must be given
retrospective effect and so control the outcome. The general rule in the
13. United States v. Mullaney (C. C. 1887) 32 Fed. 370; Bradford v.
People (1896) 22 Colo. 157, 43 Pac. 1013; State v. McKowen (1910) 126 La.
1075, 53 So. 353. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 375, sec. 2265:
"Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication, written or oral,
upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the
facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made
upon him is not a testimonial one."
14. Several jurisdictions approve of compulsory examinations to de-
termine intoxication. State v. Gatton (1938) 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E.(2d) 265. See: State v. Duguid (1937) 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435; Noe
v. Monmouth County Court (C. P. 1928) 6 N. J. Misc. 1016; Schmidt v.
District Atty. (1938) 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 787, 255 App. Div. 353. Cf. People v.
Henry (1937) 23 Cal. App. (2d) 155, 72 P. (2d) 915. For a thorough study
of the problem, see Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Blood
Tests to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191.
1. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 347.
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